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This paper challenges the dichotomous distinction between planning and the market promoted by 
mainstream economists, by arguing that markets should be seen as socially constructed not given. 
Drawing on recent developments in institutional and behavioural economics, it contends that what 
is required is not for planners to become market actors, but rather to realise they are already ‘market 
actors’ intricately involved in framing and re-framing property markets. By highlighting planners’ 
potential to re-make, rather than merely accept, market conditions, the paper calls for state-market 









According to one influential report, spatial planning is essentially about ‘shaping and delivering 
tomorrow’s places’ (UCL and Deloitte, 2007). As Allmendinger and Haughton (2007) argue, this 
requires a strong emphasis on the spatial co-ordination and integration of investment plans across 
the public sector, amounting as much to a search for spatial governance as spatial planning. Such 
integration helps distinguish the concept of spatial planning from such earlier expressions as ‘land 
use planning’ and ‘town and country planning’. In Wales, for example, preparation of a national 
spatial plan provided the opportunity to inject spatiality into such diverse arenas as transport, 
health, economic development, and cultural development (Harris and Hooper, 2004). Yet, as 
Healey (2006, p. 10) contends, in the UK, “Delivering a planning system and place management 
capacity capable of fostering, enhancing and sustaining ‘good quality places’ is a demanding 
agenda”. This she attributes to the country’s history of over-legalised land use regulation, sectoral 
separation, and under-investment in both the public realm and in planning expertise, research and 
intelligence. 
 
This paper is not intended to add to the rich debate on the nature of spatial planning as the 
‘governance of place’. Instead, since place-making requires robust connections between vision and 
delivery, it concentrates on state-market relations in land and property as an important context for 
spatial planning. In most western countries, much of the built environment is constructed and 
financed by the private sector, making the ability of spatial planners to understand and influence 
property markets and development processes a crucial test of their effectiveness. We thus take 
what Alexander (2009) describes as a teleological view of the purpose of spatial planning, in the 
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sense that setting up complex state-based systems to promote and govern place quality is justifiable 
only if it improves, and is seen to improve, the outcomes that would have otherwise been produced 
by market processes, without such intervention. 
 
Despite earlier academic interest in land and property relations (Healey, 1992a, 1992b and 1998), 
their importance for place delivery remains a minor theme in the growing spatial planning 
literature. The UCL and Deloitte (2007) study, for example, includes 415 references to spatial 
planning: 81 to local authorities, 65 to planners, 42 to health matters, but only 10 to developers. 
Perhaps this is because, as Faludi (2000) suggests, many planners inherently like to see themselves 
at the centre of the action, controlling or reining in other actors.  
 
Yet, as Albrechts (2006, p. 1161) points out, in the end “Strategic spatial planning relates to action, 
to implementation - things must get done!” Albrechts’ desire for effective connections between 
political authorities and implementing actors (within which category he includes developers) 
matches Faludi’s (2000) call to see spatial planning not as a form of directional control but rather 
one of mutual learning. In the UK, spatial planners have increasingly sought to extract greater 
financial benefits from development for the local community through planning agreements linked 
to the approval of individual planning applications1. A more interactive relationship with the 
private sector is thus particularly important in areas of significant urban change, such as 
Cambridge, where knowing how best to negotiate development pressure forms an essential part 
of the armoury of spatial planning (Healey, 2006). Such experiences reflect Needham’s (2000) 
conception of spatial planning as the design of policies capable of achieving desired spatial 
dispositions of activities, buildings, and spaces. He emphasises that “in most cases spatial planning 
is an intervention in, or an influencing of, the creation and use of the physical environment by 
others” (Needham, 2000, p. 443 – emphasis added). 
 
Such acknowledgements of the importance of effective relationships with property actors reflect 
varied earlier thinking, including Lichfield’s (1956 and 2003) concept of planned development, 
Brindley et al.’s (1989 and 1996) contrasting styles of planning, and Adams’ (1994) view of planning 
as a form of intervention in land and property development. Nonetheless, even when engaged 
with market realities, planners2 tend to adopt a detached view of the market that is implicitly 
grounded in mainstream economics. In this paper, we challenge the dichotomous distinction 
between planning and the market promoted by mainstream economists. Drawing on recent 
developments in institutional and behavioural economics, we call on planners to see themselves 
essentially as ‘market actors’ intricately involved in framing and re-framing local land and property 
markets and hence operating as a significant constitutive element of such markets. We argue that 
planners who think and act in this way are likely to find the experience empowering since it offers 
the chance to break free from discredited market-led thinking of past decades and discover instead 
how plan-shaped markets can best be created. While we suggest that local communities can benefit 
if planners seek to promote more, rather than less, efficient markets, we thus do not believe that 
market efficiency should be the sole determinant of planning action, since market transformation 
may require equal, if not greater, consideration to be given to matters of equity and sustainability. 
 
The paper thus addresses three critical research questions: 
 
1. How should planners understand the operation of land and property markets? We tackle this question 
in the next section, where we explore how recent conceptual insights that see land and 
 
1 Known as Section 75 agreements in Scotland and Section 106 agreements in England and Wales. 
2 In this paper, we use the term ‘planner’ as shorthand for planners working in the public sector, while recognising 
that many now work in the private sector. 
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property markets as socially constructed institutions within a system of institutions differ 
from more conventional counterparts. 
 
2. By what means, and to what effect, do planners already shape such markets processes? We address this 
question in the third section, where we show how planning already works to shape, regulate 
and stimulate markets, even if planners themselves do not necessarily think in these terms.  
 
3. How might planners develop their capacity as market actors to shape market processes more effectively?  
We seek to contribute to the newly-emerging debate around the effectiveness of planners 
as market actors, by tackling this question in the fourth section. Here, we identify three 
crucial capacity-building challenges for planners, revolving around the need for market-
rich information and knowledge, market-relevant skills, and market- rooted networks 
 
In the final section, we summarise our answers to the three research questions and consider their 
implications for spatial planning as both an area of professional practice and academic endeavour. 
Our central argument is that since markets are socially constructed not given, planners have much 
greater potential than they often realise to frame and re-frame land and property markets, rather 
than merely accepting or perpetuating current market conditions. We seek to raise state-market 
relations in land and property to as central a place within the new spatial planning as that presently 
occupied by spatial governance, and thus to broaden debate on what ‘shaping and delivering 
tomorrow’s places’ might really involve. 
 
2. TOWARDS A SOCIAL VIEW OF MARKETS 
 
2.1 Planners, economics and markets 
 
According to Evans (2003), communication between planners and economists is difficult, 
occasional, and characterised by ‘shouting very loudly’ as they each travel on different tracks to 
different destinations. He even suggests that “I know of no evidence that planning has in practice 
been affected by any of the contributions made by economists” (Evans, 2003, p. 196). To evaluate 
this statement, we need to distinguish between economics and markets. 
 
Many contemporary textbooks draw on Robbins’ (1932, p.15) classic definition of economics as 
“the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means 
which have alternative uses” augmented by Samuelson’s (1948) three questions of  “what?” 
“how?”, and “for whom?” (Backhouse and Medema, 2009). Thus, according to Begg et al., (2003, 
p. 3), economics “is the study of how society decides what, how and for whom to produce.” 
However, increasingly “modern economists do not subscribe to a homogeneous definition of their 
subject . . .(and) are generally guided by pragmatic considerations of what works or by 
methodological views emanating from various sources, not by formal definitions” (Backhouse and 
Medema, 2009, p. 231). 
 
Although Gravelle and Rees (2004, p. 3) define markets as existing: “whenever two or more 
individuals are prepared to enter into an exchange transaction, regardless of time or place”, Hahn 
(1993, p. 203) famously conceded that “even careful (neo-classical) theorists introduce ‘markets’ 
as a primitive concept … markets are conjured up rather than analysed.” An institutional definition 
provided by Hodgson (1988, p. 174) views the market “as a set of social institutions in which a 
large number of commodity exchanges of a specific type regularly take place, and to some extent 
are facilitated and structured by those institutions. Exchange . . . involves the contractual 
agreement and the exchange of property rights, and the market consists in part of mechanisms to 
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structure, organise and legitimate these activities. Markets, in short, are organised and 
institutionalised exchange.” 
 
Many planners, especially those working at a strategic level are explicitly concerned with economic 
matters, especially around employment and local economic growth. At a more operational level, 
the retail sector needs assessments that provide a good example of planning processes that clearly 
incorporate economic theory. The most recent government guidance in England (DCLG, 2009) 
for example, suggests that assessing retail need for a particular catchment area involves analysing 
consumer expenditure, assessing existing retail supply and market share, comparing that supply 
with demand, and subsequently assessing future capacity. More widely, sustainable development 
now calls upon planners to promote economic prosperity as well as environmental protection and 
social inclusion. Since efficient resource allocation can be seen as a matter of public interest, many 
planners would claim an economic influence on their work, even though they may be 
uncomfortable or unfamiliar with some forms of economic analysis. 
 
Markets in capitalism have long presented planners with much greater difficulties, not least because 
they tend to privilege the rich over the poor, frequently begging the question: efficiency for whom? 
As a result, it is not readily apparent how Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ produces long-term and 
collective benefit out of private and sectional interests, which triumph more immediately. The 
markets with which planners most engage – those concerned with land and property – are among 
the least efficient, owing to widespread imperfections and failure (Balchin et al., 1988). Skaburkis and 
Mok (2006, pp. 100-101) argue that such failures create some of the greatest contemporary challenges 
for planners, including “continuously expanding suburbs, the loss of access to the countryside, 
increasing congestion, extra infrastructure not covered by development charges and increased CO2  
emissions.” Healey (1992a, p. 13) comments that “Planning has often been considered as opposed 
to the market”, while Webster and Lai (2003, p. 2) suggest that “Those espousing a public service 
ethic often demonise the market.” Yet, as we argue below, the activities of planners help construct 
market, making the relationship between planning and the market symbiotic rather than 
dichotomous. 
 
2.2 The changing face of mainstream economics 
 
Economic interpretations of relations between planning policy and property markets have been 
dominated by three mainstream approaches: neo-classical economics, welfare economics3, and, 
increasingly, new institutional economics (Adams et al., 2005a and 2005b), each of which presents 
planners with a fundamentally different question. Whereas neo-classical economics asks how far 
planning policy directly affects the overall quantity of market supply and demand, welfare 
economics concentrates on the extent to which planning policy is able to overcome market failure, 
while new institutional economics focuses on its capacity to reduce (or indeed increase) market 
transaction costs (Adams et al., 2009a). In each of these approaches, the market is essentially viewed 
as dichotomous to planning: open, of course, to influence, but characterised by profit-driven 
behaviour viewed with suspicion by planners. 
 
Neo-classical economics has changed remarkably over the past 20 years to the extent it is no longer 
possible to claim that it is founded on the assumption that ‘only rationally acting individual actors 
operate on the market. Price adjustments will automatically lead to an equilibrium” (Van der 
Krabben and Lambooy, 1993, p. 1384). The central tenets of neo-classical economics – optimising 
(utility maximising) atomistic individuals, methodological individualism, deductive reasoning, 
 
3 We recognise that some economists would dispute the distinction drawn here between neo-classical and welfare 
economics. We regard them both as important components of the economic mainstream sharing the same 
methodological underpinnings, despite their important philosophical differences. 
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equilibrium, and scarcity and choice – have, to varying degrees, been challenged by the recent ‘turn’ 
in economics. The nascent developments in game theory (classic, evolutionary, and behavioural), 
complexity theory, neuroeconomics, new behavioural economics, and ‘infomatic economics’ (Fine 
and Milonakis, 2009) stress – to different extents – strategic interaction, departures from 
constrained optimisation, and the de-emphasis or eschewal of marginal trade-offs. 
 
In land and property economics, four developments are of particular note. First, information 
available to market actors is now seen as bounded and essentially asymmetric. In land and property 
analysis, such informational efficiency has been applied to distinguish between strong, semi-strong, 
and weak markets (Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999). Secondly, it has been recognised how limited 
information produces bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour to the extent that, as Ball 
(2002) argues, rationality should be regarded merely as a working hypothesis or methodological 
standard. Thirdly, property research now incorporates slow market adjustment (Wheaton et al., 1997) 
and disequilibrium (Hendershott et al., 2002). Finally, there is now much greater understanding of the 
spatial differentiation and operation of submarkets, to the extent that Healey’s (1992a) call for better 
recognition of the connections between user and investor markets has been heeded. Since neo-
classical theory no longer depends on such assumptions as perfect competition, full information 
and instant equilibrium (Maclennan and Whitehead, 1996), Ball (1998) warns us not to construct 
neo-classical economics as a straw man, fashioned in a form that can be readily knocked down. 
  
Many have seen a strong rationale in welfare economics for state intervention to improve property 
market efficiency and enhance economic welfare (Evans, 2004). Externalities, lost opportunities, 
and scant provision of public goods all provide examples of market failure where the operation of 
land and property markets is distorted by external influences. Externalities, where production or 
consumption creates social costs and benefits which markets are unable to transmit into private 
costs and benefits, have been widely seen as the classic justification for planning (Klosterman, 
1985) since the planning system is designed to prevent the over-production of negative 
externalities and the under-production of positive ones. Similarly, a planned approach should 
ensure the more efficient provision of public and semi-public goods, such as community open 
space, and prevent lost opportunities, such as the vacancy of a potential development site in 
multiple ownership, due to a lack of common agreement between its various owners about its 
future. 
 
Welfare economics has been highly influential in planning thought and planning, especially through 
its application in urban and environmental economics (see, for example, Willis, 1980; Garrod and 
Willis, 1999; Willis, 2003). It has provided an important theoretical foundation for cost-benefit 
analysis and community impact evaluation (Lichfield, 2003), which are widely practised by 
planners. The growth of new institutional economics over the past two decades represents a 
challenge to traditional welfare economics since it suggests that market failure can be better tackled 
by creating more clearly defined property rights capable of reducing transaction costs through 
minimising risk and uncertainty (Jaffe, 1996). New institutional economics, which is widely 
regarded as a key development in contemporary mainstream economics (Fine and Milonakis, 
2009), should be regarded as an extension of neo-classical economics, even though it operates with 
less formality (Samuels, 1995). Among writers who have sought to apply new institutional 
economics to planning, Alexander (2001) emphasises that, by assigning development rights, 
planning helps create the institutional environment for land and property markets. He points to 
planning’s potential to reduce the transaction costs of development by managing neighbourhood 
effects and bestowing greater certainty about the future. In this context, Webster and Lai (2003) 
contrast markets as institutions that potentially reduce individual transaction costs with government 
policies and regulations that potentially reduce collective transaction costs. However, Dawkins (2000) 
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highlights the increased transaction costs that private developers actually incur as a result of lengthy 
delays in plan approval and implementation. 
 
In summary, mainstream economists now understand the market in quite different ways from a 
generation ago. These fresh insights, for example on bounded information, limits to rationality, 
and transaction costs are beginning to affect many areas of public policy. Increasingly, economics 
draws on mathematics, psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology as more important 
sources of inspiration than the mechanics that underlie neo-classicism (Davis, 2006 and 2008). 
Nevertheless, many mainstream economists continue to see the market in positivist terms as a 
distinct identity, separate from the individual and (to some extent) opposed to the state. By 
contrast, newly emerging research, to which we now turn, is exploring how markets are essentially 
constructed through human processes, with all their unpredictability and imbalances of power.  
 
2.3 The social construction of markets 
 
Behavioural economics represents both a challenge to, and an extension of, the economic 
mainstream.  It draws on insights from human psychology and is defined by Pryce and Levin 
(2008, p.16) as “the study of the social, cognitive and emotional biases that cause economic 
decisions to deviate from rational calculations”. In a substantial review of behavioural evidence in 
economics, DellaVigna (2009) identifies three types of individual deviation from the standard neo-
classical model. These are non-standard preferences (such as take-up of unfavourable credit card 
offers), non-standard beliefs (such as over-confidence in likely success of business mergers) and 
non-standard decision-making (such as the undue influence of the reference frame to which a 
decision is anchored). 
 
Behavioural studies in both North America (Brown et al., 1981) and the UK (Goodchild and 
Munton, 1985) have long emphasised the importance of landowner characteristics in the 
conversion of land to urban development. A substantial body of work has also investigated how 
the behavioural characteristics of property valuers affect property valuations (for a review see Diaz, 
1999), while the tendency of developers to satisfice or accept sub-optimal but adequate outcomes 
has also been explained in behavioural terms (Mohamed, 2006). 
 
Behavioural economics has been popularised, and indeed politicised, by Thaler and Sunstein’s 
(2008) bestseller ‘Nudge’, in which they argue that policy-makers should work with human nature 
to encourage behavioural change by, for example, making people fully aware of their daily energy 
use. An early attempt by the UK Government to test ‘nudge economics’ in practice was evident in 
2008 when the Department of Communities and Local Government awarded Barnet Council an 
additional £100,000 to experiment with ways of encouraging people to reduce litter, recycle more, 
and lower carbon emissions (Stratton, 2008) 
 
Behavioural research suggests “that provision of information alone is unlikely to achieve significant 
or enduring behavioural change, except when the behaviour being encouraged is relatively 
convenient and cheap in terms of time, money, effort and social disapproval” (Government Office 
for Science, 2008, p.94). Indeed, as this ‘Foresight’ report points out, psychological research warns 
that one-off public information campaigns intended to change people’s behaviour can backfire in 
certain circumstances. Instead, it suggests that enduring behavioural change will not be achieved 
without systematic, concerted action, deployment of a variety of tools and strategies, sustained 
implementation over time and an approach that targets specific groups or sectors. Despite its 
current political attractiveness, there may be dangers ahead in attempting simplistically to apply 




A more radical view of markets, which can be traced back to old institutional economics 
(Rutherford, 1994) and which now connects economics and sociology, has also emerged strongly 
in recent years. As Smith et al. (2006, p. 81) explain: 
 
“Of late, there has been a paradigm shift at the interface between economy and society. Markets, 
the core concept of classical economics, have been taken for granted throughout the modern period. 
Now, for the first time in half a century, social researchers are challenging the economic 
essentialism invested in these and in other ‘stylised facts’ of economics. Terms like supply, 
demand, information, competition, efficiency, price and value have all been opened to scrutiny. . 
. . Instead, research is emphasising the social and power-filled character of markets: their diversity 
and complexity, their sensitivity to context, their passions as well as their ‘rationality’ and their 
part in the social construction and performance of the economy.” 
 
This paradigm shift has three crucial implications for the way in which planners relate to markets. 
First, if markets are viewed as essentially social constructs, it follows that they “are made, not 
given” (Christie et al., 2008, pp. 2296). This then raises the second question of how and by whom 
markets are made. Thirdly, since property markets are “dynamic, deeply contextual and contingent 
both on the particular aims and objectives of development actors, and on a shifting market 
framework which may enable or constrain development strategies” (Guy and Henneberry, 2000, 
pp. 2413), it has to be recognised that different localities may experience different forms of market 
construction. We shall now explore these points in turn. 
 
There is now a widely held view beyond mainstream economists that the market should be 
conceived as a social institution (Hodgson, 1999), a “human construct” that can be “reconstructed 
as needs and preference change” (Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999, p. 2408) or, specifically in the case of 
land and property, as a “social construct . . . understood as part of the system of social relations 
through which buildings and the built environment are produced and used in a given society” (de 
Magalhães, 2001, p. 106). This means that markets are not detached and autonomous structures, 
but fragile and contested terrains (Christie et al., 2008). Market transactions, like social interactions 
are thus conditioned by humanly devised rules, norms and regulations, with markets thus reflecting 
dominant powers and interests. These institutional insights can be linked to those from the cultural 
economy perspective (Amin, 2005; Amin and Thrift, 2003) for as Christie et al., (2008, p. 2291) 
emphasise, “markets are saturated with all kinds of emotions, sometimes calm and predictable, 
sometimes wild and out of control, sometimes dependent on aggressive behaviour, but also 
infused with humour, warmth, affection, even love.” 
 
In reflecting on how markets are made and by whom, it is important to recognise that market 
transactions are institutionally conditioned by the same set of humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic, and social interactions (North, 1991; Zhu, 2005). As Oxley (2004, p. 
59) points out, for example, “Markets are social constructs; they are not ‘natural phenomena’. . . 
The state performs essential property-right enforcing, underwriting and protecting roles that allow 
markets to function.” As Schulte (1977, p. 29 and 30) thus famously remark “there exists no such 
animal as a “natural” laissez-faire system sprung solely from private arrangements” with the result 
that “the free enterprise system, therefore, carries the label “made by government”.”  
 
The importance of market makers or intermediaries is also increasingly highlighted in 
understanding market operations. As Amin (2005, p. 14) explains, “there has been a turn to 
explaining the rules of the markets – from price formation through to actor rationality and investor 
behaviour – as a performance involving many intermediaries to get actors to think and act in 
certain ways.” De Magalhães (2001), for example, demonstrates the importance of international 
property consultants in the incorporation of Madrid and Milan into the transnational property 
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investment network from the late 1980s. Smith et al. (2006), who provide a fascinating insight into 
the role professional intermediaries played in scripting the performance of the Edinburgh housing 
market in the late 1990s, draw specific attention to the potentially destabilising impact of such 
people. Indeed, “by acting as if the system is self-regulating, by believing themselves to be 
powerless against a tidal wave of independent market forces, the work of intermediaries may help 
to place the system beyond control” (Smith et al., 2006, p. 92). In short, those who think the market 
is a neutral allocator of resources might actually amplify market volatility.  
 
If professional intermediaries create market performance, then so, too, do planners. How well 
planners are embedded into what might be described as the development network of international 
institutional investors, major commercial property developers, local communities, government, 
and others (Doak and Karadimitriou, 2007) affects their capacity to participate in this performance. 
Reflecting the importance of common honesty and decency in making business deals (Hodgson, 
1999), the extent to which planners and planning committees can be trusted (Hess, 2009; Höppner, 
2009; Swain and Tait, 2007) may also determine their potential influence as market actors. 
 
These insights into market construction produce strongly disaggregated view of market structures, 
with each sub- or local market reflective of its own routines, procedures, distinctive relations, social 
culture, and other institutions. Guy et al. (2002) powerfully demonstrate this in relation to 
Manchester, where the alternative cultural framework of local ‘maverick developers’ produced a 
very different built form in the Northern Quarter of the city centre from that in the nearby Square 
Half Mile, where London-based institutional investors were dominant. There is thus no single land 
and property market, but many markets, each reflecting the distinctive characteristics of their own 
locality. 
 
Once markets are seen as socially constructed not given, it becomes fallacious to place planning 
and the market in a dichotomous relationship. We thus need to ask how planners have helped 
construct markets, and to explore their potential to do so differently in the future. We open up 
this debate in the next section. 
 
3. HOW PLANNERS HELP CONSTRUCT MARKETS 
 
3.1 The means by which planners help construct markets 
 
At this stage, it is helpful to distinguish more clearly between the development process and 
property markets. Development is a production process that creates the built environment. It is 
essentially about that moment of spontaneous change that may happen every 20, 40, 100 or more 
years. Left to itself, this spontaneity produces enormous and indeed unpredictable urban change, 
whose implications may not be immediately apparent (Webster and Lai, 2003). Spatial planning 
acts as a form of intervention at this fleeting moment. Yet, development is but one component of 
the wider property market, which can be sub-divided by motive of acquisition into the user, 
investment, and development markets (Keogh, 1994). The impact of spatial planning is direct in 
the development market, but indirect in the user and investment markets. This impact operates 
through three types of policy instrument, intended respectively to shape, regulate and stimulate 
markets (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005). In other words, development control and development 
promotion are as much part of spatial planning in its broadest sense as development planning. 
 
Market-shaping instruments, such as ‘development’, ‘regulatory’ and ‘indicative’ plans, set an 
important context for market actions and transactions, especially by offering a ‘political position 
statement’ (Healey, 1992a) about the kinds of development that are likely to be favoured by the 
planning authority. Market regulation instruments, such as development control and restrictive 
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covenants attached to land transfers, restrict the parameters of market actions and transactions. In 
recent years, at least in the UK, extraction of community benefits from developers in the form of 
planning gain has increasingly accompanied market regulation, with the effect that the concept of 
planners as market actors has become ever more familiar in practice. Market stimulation 
instruments, such as development subsidies and compulsory purchase, lubricate market actions 
and transactions. 
 
These three categories are conceptual, and will rarely, if ever, be found as explicitly in planning 
documents. Nevertheless, they can often be discerned through careful content analysis of such 
documents. Adams et al. (2009a), for example, analysed 64 planning, housing, transport and 
regeneration strategies and policies published by the Scottish Executive between 1999 and 2009 
to discover their implicit property market policy. This revealed that the Executive had implicitly 
pursued nine policies intended to shape property markets, six to regulate them and four to 
stimulate them. Relevant examples include: 
 
• “Planning authorities should ensure that the housing market requirement for each housing 
market area is met in full” (Shaping) 
• “Developers should make a greater contribution towards increasing the supply of 
affordable homes, through agreements tied to planning permissions” (Regulating) 
• “Developers should be encouraged, through policy initiatives and development subsidies, 
to build in the most deprived areas” (Stimulation). 
 
The research concluded that the Scottish Executive property policy was primarily grounded in 
neo-classical and welfare economics, demonstrated by the statement that “within the established 
frameworks of planning policies, the essential thrust of ‘property policy’ is that markets should 
lead change and that policy action should be to reduce or remove market failures, largely induced 
by poor information and perceived risks. In that respect key dimensions of policy should be to 
deliver the remediation of contaminated land, to provide significant amounts of local market 
information and to provide types of property or developments in locations where latent demands 
exist, but market developers do not provide (because of poor information)” (Scottish Executive, 
2003, para 3.6.4). 
 
This statement provides a rare example of explicit policy attention to property markets. Yet, our 
proposition that planners are important market actors does not depend on whether planning 
documents are organised by market shaping, regulation, and stimulation themes, or on whether 
planners themselves would recognise this interpretation of their activities. Instead, what is crucial 
is the market impact of planning actions to which we next turn by highlighting the substantial body 
of literature looking beyond the formal appearance of planning as an act of spatial governance to 
its actual market consequences. In Albrechts’ (2006) terms, this raises issues central to whether 
and how ‘things get done’.  
 
3.2 The market impact of planning actions 
 
Over the years, there has been a rich and varied debate in the literature on the market impact of 
planning actions. Three powerful, but not exclusive, themes emerge from this debate. The first 
concerns the impact of spatial planning on a country’s overall economic performance, along with 
the spatial differences that arise when that performance is disaggregated by region or another areal 
component. Relevant questions here include whether spatial planning impedes or facilitates 
economic growth, for example by increasing or reducing the costs of space occupancy, and 
whether it redistributes welfare between areas and/or socio-economic groups. We label these kind 
of issues ‘macroeconomic’ in the sense that they are concerned with the broad impact of planning 
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on wealth creation and distribution as a whole. The second theme is more local and concentrates 
on the immediate impact of planning actions on the patterns of land values in any locality. Relevant 
contributions here have concentrated on the extent to which spatial planning may create, destroy 
or distribute local land value patterns. Since we are primarily concerned with the impact of this on 
the future built environment, we use the label ‘urban land economic’ to describe these kind of 
issues. Finally, much controversy has been generated by claims that planning intervention has 
rendered particular developments ‘unviable’, especially by increasing the cost of developments or 
delaying their delivery. We label this debate ‘microeconomic’ since it is conducted at the level of 




Macroeconomic analysis emphasises the extent to which restrictive planning policies make land 
and property more expensive through constraining supply. In the UK, particular attention has 
been paid to the extent to which planning restrictions have been responsible for the much higher 
rate of house price inflation than in European countries (see, for example, Bramley, 1993, 1998, 
1999 and 2007; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989 and 1996; Evans, 1988 and 1991; Meen, 2005).  This 
substantial body of work has produced a consensus, at least among economists, that restrictive 
planning policies lead to higher house prices and higher residential densities4. As a result, some 
groups such as landowners and those already well established in the housing market, gain while 
others, such as first time buyers, lose. Elsewhere, similar forces may be at work in the business and 
industrial sectors (Henneberry et al., 2005), though apparently not in the retail sector (Jackson and 
Watkins, 2005). 
 
Concerns about the consequent macroeconomic impact of the unstable and inflation-prone British 
housing market compared to many other European countries led the UK Government to 
commission Kate Barker (2003 and 2004) to undertake a fundamental review of housing supply, 
in which the role of planning restrictions was accorded particular prominence. Barker’s review 
emphasised the negative long-term impact of such restrictions on housing affordability, which 
produced a new policy emphasis, at least in England, on trying to improve affordability by releasing 
more land for housing development (DCLG, 2006a and 2008; NHPAU, 2008). Barker’s influence 
on national planning guidance in England has since been far-reaching, with planners now expected 
explicitly to consider the impact of planning policies on local housing markets by undertaking 
Strategic Housing Market Assessments. The core outputs of such assessments are to include 
“Analysis of past and current housing market trends, including balance between supply and 
demand in different housing sectors and price/affordability” and “Description of key drivers 
underpinning the housing market” (DCLG, 2007a, p.10)5. 
 
The ‘house price inflation/affordability’ turn in planning policy tends to produce one of two 
reactions from the planning profession. Denial of responsibility, with the finger pointed elsewhere 
is the first of these (CPRE, 2007; RTPI, 2007). Disinterested resignation, reflected by the view that 
constraining supply is an essential part of planning, even if it leads to higher house prices, is the 
 
4 Ironically, of course, rapid house price inflation generated the substantial growth in land values that planning 
authorities have sought to capture through planning gain. 
5 Intriguingly, Barker’s call for the planning system to be more responsive to market signals was reflected more strongly 
in the consultative draft of the new PPS 3: Housing published in 2005 (ODPM, 2005) than in the final version, which 
emerged a year later (DCLG, 2006a). While the former proposed that speedy take-up of allocated development sites 
might trigger further immediate releases, the latter contained only a more general expectation for local planning 
authorities to take market information in account. Moreover, research commissioned by the DCLG (2007b) 
highlighted both the complexity of incorporating market signals within the planning process and the impossibility of 




second. Crucially, both reactions demonstrate the profession’s failure to understand the very 
macroeconomic analysis that has proved so influential on government policy. What therefore is 
missing from the debate is rigorous economic analysis of whether and how different planning 
approaches might contribute more to revenues than costs, and thus generate higher value added. 
Interestingly, other economists have now begun to develop alternative explanation of British 
house price inflation, placing emphasis on interest rate shifts rather than planning policy (Levin 
and Pryce, 2009). 
 
Although business interests have often drawn attention to the transaction costs of the planning 
system (CBI, 2004 and 2005), an answer is still awaited to the important macroeconomic question 
posed earlier by Healey (1992a, p. 13), namely “Do plans stabilise land and property markets, 
creating greater certainty, thereby reducing transaction costs and by limiting the potential for ‘over-
building’ in a property market, producing greater efficiency in the relation between supply and 
demand in the land markets?” Certainly, since  the persistence of habit in developer behaviour 
leads to over-building (Antwi and Henneberry, 1995), there are likely to be some developers in the 
current recession who are thankful for the planning delays that prevented new development at the 
height of the last boom. 
 
Urban land economic impacts 
 
Much of the debate around the impact of planning on urban land markets has been conducted in 
relative terms, often under the false assumption that while planning policy may redistribute value 
around the city, and especially between potential development areas at the urban fringe, its overall 
impact is neutral. This mistaken approach can be traced back at least to the Uthwatt Report (1942), 
with its view of floating and shifting values, which has been much criticised for its unrealistic 
assumptions and static understanding of land price determination (Adams et al., 2005a). 
 
As a result, planners may not think directly about how they can help create urban land value by, 
for example, improving accessibility and complementarity within the city.  Balchin et al. (1995, p. 
106-7) argue that “as the value of privately owned land may be increased by changes in the public 
land use infrastructure, town planning can be seen as a means of increasing the values of private 
and profitable uses of land”. In some cases, this involves what Healey (1992a) describes as the 
activity of ‘creating markets’ through a strategic development or regeneration framework, which 
uses public-sector vision and investment to rescue weak local property markets, then breeds 
confidence and co-ordination among private landowners and developers. More recent 
econometric-based research has begun to explore connections between greenfield land release and 
the viability of nearby brownfield development, opening up new ways for planners to 




At the level of the firm, the impact of planning systems on financial appraisals has generated 
increasing interest in the policy community. For example, the Scottish Government’s (2009) guide 
to development viability, expressly intended to inform the work of local planning authorities, 
reflects renewed demands for more market-aware forms of planning. A key issue here is the extent 
to which planning acts as a risk-reduction or risk-intensification measure, through making the 
future (and the steps by which it is achieved) more or less certain. As Adair et al. (1998, p. 16) 
comment in relation to urban regeneration, “reduction of risk is a key issue with the result that 
private sector investment depends on the facilitating role of the public sector”. Although planners 
may not necessarily think in these terms, academic research has pointed to the potential of planning 
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as a risk-reduction mechanism (see, for example, Neutze, 1987), though this has not yet been explored 
in any depth from an empirical perspective.   
 
In summary, this section has argued that planning does indeed serve to shape, regulate and simulate 
markets and that the economic effects of this is evident at the macro, urban land, and micro levels. In 
central government, at least in England, economists have become ever more powerful in driving 
forward planning policy, to the extent that the former Chief Economist and Head of Analytical 
Services Directorate at the Department for Communities and Local Government was able to claim 
that “Economics is at the heart of what we do in the Department. We need to understand – and 
be capable of thinking rigorously about – the choices and trade-offs that people make in reaching 
decisions, what can incentivise behaviour, and how markets operate and change” (DCLG, 2007c, 
p.4). The working paper that included this statement in its forward contained a wide-ranging 
economic analysis of the perceived rationale for spatial government intervention in markets. 
Significantly, this paid little heed to the social construction of markets but instead reflected the 
dominance of neo-classical, welfare, and neo-institutional economic discourses within government 
thinking. 
 
However, while mainstream economists have thus become increasingly influential in government 
planning circles, the academic and professional planning community remains largely disconnected 
from the growing debate around planning, economics and markets. As a result, critics can continue 
to claim that planners stand in opposition to markets and that planning takes little account of 
economists. To counter this requires a paradigm shift among planners that raises the creation of value, 
rather than its mere distribution, as a central concern. As we explore in the next section, this demands 
substantial effort in capacity-building. 
 
4. HOW PLANNERS MIGHT MORE EFFECTIVELY CONSTRUCT MARKETS  
 
According to Hamilton’s (1932, p. 84) classic definition, an institution is: “a way of thought or 
action of some prevalence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of people.” 
In the previous section, we suggested that planners already serve as market actors, shaping, 
regulating, and stimulating market activity. But, crucially, planners do not necessarily see 
themselves playing this role, with the result that their market influence is less effective than it might 
otherwise be. The institutional change that, in Hamilton’s terms, is required is not for planners to 
become market actors, but rather to realise that they already are market actors, intricately involved in 
framing and re-framing local land and property markets. 
 
This implies, at a conceptual level, that spatial planning should be as much concerned with market 
participation as spatial governance and that, where required, legislative and procedural reform 
should proceed from this principle. It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest how that reform 
might develop, save to mention as an example that tackling ownership constraints to urban 
redevelopment (Adams et al., 2002) might become a greater planning priority in future, since every 
piece of land has an owner and a value, as well as a use. Instead, our focus in this section is on 
what could be done to build the operational capacity of planners as market actors. While we 
emphasise the importance of institutional change as a starting point (in the sense that planners 
may first need to be encouraged break free from those inherited mindsets that see planning as 
dichotomous to the market and so constrained that it must cede much influence to the market), 
creative thinking alone will not turn planners into more effective markets actors. Instead, we 
concentrate here on building planners’ capacity in three crucial areas: market-rich information and 





4.1 Market-rich information and knowledge 
 
Planners have traditionally been strong in collecting information on people and place (for example, 
from the census and local surveys) but much weaker in obtaining similar data for land and property 
markets. There has indeed been some suspicion about whether prices, values and ownership are 
proper planning matters, reflecting the fear that too close a knowledge of such information would 
soon result in a market-led style of planning. Since the impact of the Barker Review on national 
planning policy in England, there has been an explicit expectation that the new Local Development 
Frameworks will reflect the wide-ranging analysis of local housing markets required in Strategic 
Housing Market Assessments, although the same cannot be said for information on commercial 
and industrial property markets. Moreover, the IPD Regeneration Index, published annually by 
the Homes and Communities Agency (2009a) (and previously, by English Partnerships) shows 
how reliable property market statistics can be used to test, demonstrate, and reinforce the success 
of urban regeneration policies. 
 
A wide range of statistical time series on the performance of property markets at the national, 
regional, and, increasingly, local level, are now available for access by both public and private-
sector sources, and these, together with the more qualitative market reports published by most 
leading property agents, would provide planners with a much richer information base about the 
performance of their markets. Better market information might, for example, enable planners to 
understand more clearly how ‘windows of development opportunity’ open and  close between 
places and, where possible, to take advantage of this information. 
 
Such initial information needs to be reinforced by a better understanding of the motives and 
behaviour of private-sector implementation agents, in order to recognise which landowners, 
developers and investors are most likely to share policy agendas, and which are likely to be more 
hostile. Here, the research community could make a far greater contribution to effective policy-
making, for example, by teasing out the distinction between ‘place-based’ and ‘non place-based’ 
entrepreneurs. Drawing on Guy et al. (2002), we can suggest that place-based entrepreneurs are 
those who actively work with the grain of a city, responding to local factors, seeing added value in 
design, and taking a broader view of where development potential exists. They are typified by 
locally, relatively small-scale, independent entrepreneurs. Non-place entrepreneurs tend to ignore, 
undervalue, or actively work against the grain of a city. They take a more limited view of where 
development potential exists and are generally risk-averse. They are typified by externally based 
institutional investors. As this illustration suggests, rich qualitative knowledge of the local market 
can be as important for planners as robust statistics. 
 
In residential development, Urban Splash, the innovative Manchester-based company, founded by 
the locally-based cultural entrepreneur Tom Bloxham in 1993, provides an excellent example of 
how locally-embedded knowledge and sensitivity can achieve highly sustainable forms of 
development. In her research on speculative housebuilder responses to the brownfield agenda, 
Payne (2009) argues that the most inventive brownfield developments since the late 1990s were 
driven forward by companies such as Urban Splash, who she labels as ‘pioneers’ in the 
housebuilding industry, since they developed alternative and innovative design solutions for 
brownfield projects. However, she reveals that such specialist housebuilders were small in number 
and were more than outweighed by other developers, termed ‘sceptics’, who were inherently 
reluctant to take on brownfield sites. What made the difference to the overall balance of housing 
production during these years was the middle group of housebuilders, termed ‘pragmatists’, whose 
familiar greenfield markets proved increasingly hard to access as planning restrictions tightened, 




4.2 Market-relevant skills 
 
In the RTPI’s 2004 revisions to its guidance on the content of academic planning education, the 
following two indicative learning outcomes were included among those expected from typical 
graduates in spatial planning:  
 
• Recognise the role in the planning process of such skills as negotiation, mediation, and 
advocacy and the importance of team-working, often with other professionals, in an inter-
disciplinary context (Outcome 5) 
• Understand the relationship between market processes, built form, different development 
models and patterns of movement, evaluate the economic and financial implications of 
alternative development strategies and consider how best to generate and capture added 
value for both particular interests and the wider community (Outcome 13) 
 
Since both these statements represented an evolution of earlier RTPI education guidance, it can 
be argued that the most significant change in 2004 was the greater encouragement given to cross 
or multi-disciplinary education, partly in response to the emerging Egan Review (2004), and partly 
because many universities had moved planning into multi-disciplinary schools. There has since 
been a significant growth in jointly accredited planning programmes in the UK, in some instances 
producing more architect-planners, but more often linking planning and real estate. While many 
more planning graduates in the future are thus likely to know about what is (perhaps mistakenly) 
called ‘development economics’ than in the past, the urgent need to improve such skill sets among 
those already in the profession is now widely recognised (Homes and Communities Agency, 
2009b). 
 
Here, however, we need to distinguish between shallow and substantive skills. It can be ‘a 
dangerous thing’ if planners gain only limited awareness of development economics, for this 
merely reinforces acceptance of market-led planning, in which planners develop a more 
sympathetic understanding of developers’ calculations, but do not have the expertise to challenge 
them fundamentally. As effective market actors, planners need to be able to negotiate financially 
on level terms with developers, and this requires substantial knowledge not shallow awareness of 
development economics. 
 
Negotiation has become an increasingly important skill in planning as a result of the widening 
scope and extent of financial benefits that planning authorities now seek to extract from both 
housebuilders and commercial developers in the form of planning gain. Now that the example of 
the Milton Keynes ‘roof tax’ or ‘development tariff’ has been formalised into the recently enacted 
Community Infrastructure Levy in England as a means of paying for urban infrastructure, spatial 
planning is moving much more towards a negotiative relationship with the private sector than at 
any time since the introduction of comprehensive planning in 1947. The extent to which individual 
local authorities and planners are likely to negotiate successfully under the new arrangements may 
well reflect their prior experience over the past two or three decades, since extracting increased 
community benefits through planning agreements or obligations has become an ever more 
common element of planning practice during that time. As Government-commissioned research 
on the value of planning obligations found, individual planners “can maximise contributions 
through the use of experience gained in previous negotiations and the support of a clear policy 
framework” (DCLG, 2006c, p.54). This reinforces the earlier points on the power of information, 
since control over information enhances bargaining strength. 
  
Negotiation theory makes a clear distinction between competitive and collaborative negotiation 
(Fisher and Ury, 1991). Competitive negotiation is about the distribution of fixed value and is 
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characterised by a ‘win-lose’ outcome. Collaborative (or integrative) negotiation is about both the 
creation and distribution of added value and is potentially characterised by a ‘win-win’ outcome. 
It is tempting for planners to see themselves engaged merely in competitive negotiation with the 
private sector. In fact, strategic market management is more likely to involve collaborative 
negotiation, in which planning action helps transform market potential, rather than simply dividing 
up the spoils in a different way. 
 
4.3 Market-rooted networks 
 
In recent years, the neat separation between public and private-sector development has begun to 
break down. Public-private partnerships, for example, now deliver many forms of development 
(schools, hospitals etc) that would previously have been commissioned and paid for entirely by the 
public sector. The consequence is that if planners wish to do more than merely frustrate 
development, they must increasingly rely on implementation agents in the private and voluntary 
sectors.  This has important ethical implications, since to balance the demands of probity and 
reality, considerable care needs to be taken over the manner in which non-public implementation 
agents are involved in the policy-delivery process. 
 
In this context, capacity building requires greater trust, mutual respect, and a willingness to work 
together in partnership to achieve mutually beneficial and desirable outcomes. While planners may 
therefore need to develop more effective connections with other market actors, allowing them to 
understand their strategies, interests and actions more fully, this should not be seen as a one-way 
relationship. Indeed, Healey (1998, p. 212) has argued that “Urban policy thus needs both to 
consider how to promote and sustain the institutional capacity of the development industry 
operating in specific urban areas, and to work out how best to regulate the activities of the industry 
to ensure quality concerns are addressed.” As an example, in Scotland the Executive’s Architecture 
Policy includes the following statement: “Using a similar approach to its current work with NHS 
Scotland, the Architecture and Design Scotland Enabling programme will be used to strengthen 
the skills and vision of other clients and developers. We will also use exemplars and case studies 
to demonstrate and communicate best practice” (Scottish Executive, 2007, p. 52).  The challenge 
for planners is thus to develop more richly grounded market networks that facilitate mutual 
learning and sharing of experience in a manner that breaks down hostility between the private and 
public sectors. 
 
In this section, we have indicated some of the ways in which the planning profession is moving.  
In future, movement in these directions s likely to be more rapid, as planners increasingly engage 
with other market actors to deliver spatial plans. We have attempted to illustrate the increasing 
importance to planners of market-rich information and knowledge, market-relevant skills, and 
market-rooted networks with some relevant, though limited examples. Our purpose is to highlight 
the largely untapped potential of planners to re-make, rather than merely accept, market 
conditions. This depends on a clearer appreciation of markets as social constructs, a theme to 




Many planners in practice may view our call for greater market engagement with some disdain. 
They may well provide evidence that they are already engaged with the market on a daily basis, and 
would be right to do so, especially in the context of the much greater importance now accorded 
to negotiations with developers to secure planning gains. This suggests that what is missing is not 
practical engagement between planners and other market actors, but conceptual development that 
might make more sense of all this activity and, in due course, help it to become more effective. As 
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Healey’s work in the early 1990s suggested “Instead of simplistic oppositions between planning 
and the market which tended to structure debate in the 1980s, it is now more productive to explore 
the interactions between planning regulation and market conditions” (Healey, 1992b, p. 420). Since 
then, however, there has been little concerted academic interest in state-market relations in land 
and property, apart from the notable contributions grounded in new institutional economics of 
Pennington (2000) and Webster and Lai (especially their 2003 book, but also a series of papers, 
written both individually and jointly). 
 
In this paper, we have argued for greater academic advances in research on what it means for 
spatial planning to see markets as essentially socially constructed. Without such progress, planning 
remains in danger of slipping back into market-led modes of thinking, producing a generation of 
academics who repeat the critical errors of Roweis and Scott (1977) and others, who contended 
that, in practice, planning exists to serve property development and investment interests. 
 
To break free from any perceived dichotomy between planning and the market, we answer our 
first research question by emphasising that markets are socially constructed and that, regardless of 
whether they themselves recognise it, planners are essentially market actors, constantly involved 
in the construction and re-construction of land and property markets. One specific example that 
illustrates this well is the notion of market capacity, which determines the speed at which private 
residential developers construct housing estates (Adams et al., 2009b). Recent research shows how 
planning restraints on land release encourage housebuilders to make the most optimistic revenue 
predictions in bidding for land, which can later be achieved only by limiting the number of units 
for sale at any one time. As a result “the concept of market capacity needs to be viewed essentially 
as a ‘commercial construct’ contingent on that particular set of relationships between the state and 
the market which delineate the present structure of speculative housebuilding provision. Failure 
to recognise this helps ensure this construct is embedded within the culture of the industry and 
then transmitted into, and reinforced by, the decision-making processes of a planning system” 
(Adams et al., 2009b, p. 298). 
 
Our second research question concerned the means and effect by which planners help construct 
land and property markets. Although planners in practice may not categorise what they do as 
shaping, regulating and stimulating markets, we contend that this is a helpful way to think about 
market engagement. Here we do not restrict ourselves merely to statutory planning activities, but 
instead take the broader view of planning as an activity that includes all policy actions associated 
with land and property development, including relevant planning, transport, housing, land, 
environmental policies etc. The importance of this is emphasised by Jackson and Watkins (2005), 
who, in evaluating the impact of planning on retail property markets, acknowledge that policy is 
complex and multidimensional and includes, for example, town centre management activities, as 
well as statutory planning policies. Significantly, they warn that “real estate modellers should avoid 
adopting narrower conceptions of the role of planning as a limited development control function” 
(Jackson and Watkins, 2005, p. 1466). Unfortunately, much of the research we reviewed on the 
economic impacts of planning from the macro, urban land, and micro perspectives is specifically 
grounded in this narrower view, which predates the arrival of spatial planning. One crucial 
information gap that urgently needs to be closed between planners and many economists thus 
concerns the nature of planning itself. 
 
We answer our third research question by reiterating the need for planners to think and operate as 
market actors and crucially to build their capacity to do so. Real market engagement, and, indeed, 
market transformation in many locations, requires emphasis on market-rich information and 
knowledge, market-relevant skills, and better connectivity with market networks. We see hopeful 
signs of this in the reforms to planning education undertaken in the UK from 2004, and especially 
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in the development of more multi-disciplinary approaches to educating the next generation of 
planners. Nevertheless, despite daily encounters with other market actors, we also see many 
planning practitioners struggling with what it means to engage and reconstruct markets, rather 
than be subservient to them. Here, we believe academics and theorists have a significant 
responsibility in the years ahead to raise state-market relations to as central a place within the new 
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